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Abstract
Recent research has highlighted risks associated with the use of climate engineering as a
method of stabilizing global temperatures, including the possibility of rapid climate warming in
the case of abrupt removal of engineered radiative forcing. In this study, we have used a simple
climate model to estimate the likely range of temperature changes associated with
implementation and removal of climate engineering. In the absence of climate engineering,
maximum annual rates of warming ranged from 0.015 to 0.07 ◦C/year, depending on the
model’s climate sensitivity. Climate engineering resulted in much higher rates of warming, with
the temperature change in the year following the removal of climate engineering ranging from
0.13 to 0.76 ◦C. High rates of temperature change were sustained for two decades following the
removal of climate engineering; rates of change of 0.5 (0.3, 0.1) ◦C/decade were exceeded over
a 20 year period with 15% (75%, 100%) likelihood. Many ecosystems could be negatively
affected by these rates of temperature change; our results suggest that climate engineering in the
absence of deep emissions cuts could arguably constitute increased risk of dangerous
anthropogenic interference in the climate system under the criteria laid out in the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
Keywords: geoengineering, climate engineering, rapid climate change, dangerous
anthropogenic interference
1. Introduction
It has become evident in recent years that efforts to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions through international policies, like
the Kyoto Protocol, have fallen far short of reaching their goals
(Raupach et al 2007). Many of the outlined emissions targets
that have been set in place for some time now, in several
international frameworks, are very far from being attained.
These continued sluggish efforts to mitigate climate change
in conjunction with the increasing evidence that suggests
our planet may be closer to unsafe levels of anthropogenic
climate change than previously anticipated (Hansen 2005),
have prompted numerous climate scientists to look towards an
alternate solution to the impending problem. As a result, there
has been recent renewed interest in direct climate intervention
1 Author to whom any correspondence should be addressed.
or geoengineering as a possible means to offset greenhouse-
gas-induced climate change (Crutzen 2006).
Geoengineering is defined as the, ‘. . . intentional large-
scale manipulation of the environment . . .’ to counteract
anthropogenic climate change (Keith 2000). Some proposed
geoengineering schemes include: atmospheric scatters (sulfate
injections into the stratosphere), space-based scatters, land
surface albedo modifications, ocean fertilization, carbon
capture and sequestration (Keith 2000). Climate engineering
refers more specifically to those schemes, which are aimed
at decreasing incoming solar radiation. Previous modeling
studies showed that geoengineering schemes could effectively
stabilize global temperatures, albeit with some regional
variability in effectiveness (Govindasamy and Caldeira 2000).
It has also been suggested that a combined approach of
emissions reduction and geoengineering could create an
optimal economic strategy for solving the problem of climate
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change (Wigley 2006). Typically, geoengineering schemes
aim to avert catastrophic climatic impacts thus reducing the
risks of dangerous climate change. However, geoengineering
carries its own risks. For example, Trenberth and Dai (2007)
and Bala et al (2008) identified possible impacts of albedo
geoengineering on the hydrological cycle, and Tilmes et al
(2008) showed that stratospheric ozone could be affected by
stratospheric sulfate aerosol injection. Matthews and Caldeira
(2007) showed that in the case of an abrupt termination of
geoengineering, there would be the potential for very rapid
warming as climate re-adjusts to high greenhouse gas levels
in the atmosphere without the countervailing influence of
geoengineering.
In this study, we focus on the potential for rapid climate
change associated with geoengineering. The importance of
the rate of temperature change (in addition to the amount of
change) was recognized in the Article 2 of the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
According to this Article:
‘The ultimate objective of this Convention . . . is to
achieve . . . stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations
in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a
level should be achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow
ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change . . .’ (emphasis
added) (UNFCCC 1992).
While this statement does not explicitly define what
constitutes ‘dangerous’ climate change, it can be inferred that
both the absolute magnitude of climate change (as determined
by the greenhouse gas stabilization level) and the rate of
climate change (as determined by the time frame over which
stabilization is achieved) can contribute to the possibility of
dangerous anthropogenic interference in the climate system.
In this study, we highlight the relationship between
geoengineering and rapid climate change by quantifying
the risk of abrupt temperature change in a scenario where
climate engineering is used to stabilize temperatures in
the context of business as usual (BAU) greenhouse gas
emissions. In particular, we estimate the likelihood of
rapid temperature change following the removal (or failure)
of climate engineering technologies. We compare our
estimated rates of temperature change with available estimates
of ecosystem resiliency to the rate of climate change, and
argue, based on this analysis, that geoengineering could in
fact contribute to increased risk of dangerous anthropogenic
interference in the climate system, as defined by the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change.
2. Methods
In this study we use the MAGICC (Model for the Assessment
of Greenhouse-gas-Induced Climate Change) climate model
to quantify the effects of the implementation and subsequent
removal of climate engineering on the climate system.
MAGICC is a set of coupled gas cycle, climate and ice-
melt models, which allows the user to determine the global
mean temperature and sea-level responses to user-specified
greenhouse gas and sulfur dioxide emissions. The MAGICC
model is described in detail in Wigley et al (2000) and
is one of the primary models used in the IPCC reports
to project future global mean temperature and sea-level
rise. We applied geoengineering in the MAGICC model as
follows: net radiative forcing values from greenhouse gases
and aerosols were obtained by running the model under a
mid-range business as usual emissions scenario (AIB). In
a second simulation, geoengineering was implemented as a
specified forcing of equal magnitude (but opposite sign) to
the forcing from anthropogenic greenhouse gases and aerosols.
This geoengineering forcing was applied in the year 2020
and removed in 2060. These paired business as usual and
geoengineering simulations were repeated approximately 40
times each, varying the climate sensitivity of MAGICC from
0.5 to 10 ◦C.
We used the estimated climate sensitivity probability
density function from Hegerl et al (2006) to assign likelihood
values to each set of model simulations.
Climate sensitivity is defined as the equilibrium response
of global mean surface air temperature to a doubling of the
carbon dioxide concentration (Meehl et al 2007). According
to the IPCC FAR (Fourth Assessment Report), equilibrium
climate sensitivity is likely to lie in the range 2–4.5 ◦C, with a
most likely value of 3 ◦C. Hegerl et al (2006) estimated a likely
range of climate sensitivity of between 1.5 and 6.2 ◦C, with a
most likely value of 2.5 ◦C; we take this estimate to be broadly
representative of the range of climate sensitivity probability
distributions presented in Meehl et al (2007), though note that
the specific values we report here are dependent on this choice
of climate sensitivity probability distribution.
The emissions scenario used in all of the model
simulations was taken from the IPCC SRES (special report
on emissions scenarios) library and is called A1B-AIM
(Nakicenovic et al 2000). According to the report, the A1B
scenario group assumes a ‘balanced’ approach in the future,
in which there are no technologies that gain an overwhelming
advantage. This scenario group includes the A1B marker
scenario developed using the AIM model. In the A1B-
AIM marker scenario, the global average per capita energy
demand grows from 54 GJ in 1990 to 247 GJ in 2100
(IPCC 2007). Throughout this time carbon intensity declines
relatively slowly until 2050, which results in a rapid increase
in carbon dioxide emissions in the first decades of the century.
However, after 2050, when the balanced structural changes in
the energy sector begin to take effect, carbon intensity drops
quickly. The overall result is that growing energy demands
from an increasing prosperous population is offset and carbon
emissions decline between the years 2050 and 2100 (IPCC
2007). It should also be noted that this mid-century drop
in carbon intensity can be seen as a decrease in the rate of
temperature between 2040 and 2050 in figure 2(a).
3. Results
Figure 1 shows the temperature change with respect to the
year 1990 for the business as usual scenario (BAU) and the
case where climate engineering was applied from 2020 to
2059. With no climate engineering, temperature increased
consistently throughout the 21st century; temperature increases
from 1990 to 2100 ranged from 0.6 to 5.1 ◦C for climate
2
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Figure 1. Temperature change with respect to the year 1990 for the
business as usual scenario (BAU) (A), and the case where
geoengineering is applied from 2020 to 2059 (B). Each line
represents a different climate sensitivity as indicated in the color bar.
sensitivities from 0.5 to 10 ◦C. CO2 concentrations at the
year 2100 varied from 690 to 739 ppmv, where higher climate
sensitivities led to slightly higher CO2 concentrations due to
the effect of positive climate carbon cycle feedbacks. In
the climate engineering simulations, temperatures returned
close to year-1990 temperatures between 2020 and 2059.
When the engineered forcing was removed temperatures
increased abruptly towards a level consistent with atmospheric
greenhouse gas concentrations. Furthermore, the temperature
change following the removal of climate engineering increased
with higher values of climate sensitivity yielding a temperature
change between 0.15 and 4.5 ◦C between 2060 and 2100.
The final CO2 concentrations in the geoengineering runs were
comparable to those in the BAU simulations (between 689 and
722 ppmv).
Figure 2 shows the annual rate of temperature change
between 1990 and 2100 for each set of simulations. In the
BAU ensemble (figure 2(A)) the annual rate of temperature
change increased steadily until the year 2060, after which
greenhouse gas emissions decline in the A1B emissions
scenario (Nakicenovic et al 2000) leading to a decreased
rate of temperature change. In the climate engineering runs
(figure 2(B)), the rate of temperature change was small up to
Figure 2. Annual rate of temperature change for the business as
usual scenario (BAU) (A), and the case where geoengineering is
applied from 2020 to 2059 (B). Each line represents a different
climate sensitivity as indicated in the color bar.
the year 2020, whereupon temperatures decreased following
the abrupt implementation of geoengineering. The rate of
temperature change was negligible up until 2060, at which
point temperatures increased very abruptly in response to
the removal of climate engineering. The maximum rate of
warming varied from 0.13 to 0.76 ◦C/year, though these very
high rates of warming were not sustained for more than a
few years; within a decade, rates of temperature change had
decreased to less than 0.1 ◦C/year. The maximum rate of sea-
level rise in the geoengineering simulations was also higher
than in the BAU simulations (not shown), though the difference
was less extreme on account of the slower response time of
ocean temperatures to external forcing.
Figure 3(A) shows the probability density functions for the
maximum annual temperature change between 1990 and 2100.
For the business as usual (BAU) simulation the most likely
maximum annual temperature change was only 0.031 ◦C/year.
In the geoengineering simulation the most likely maximum rate
of temperature change was just under 0.5 ◦C/year, occurring
in the year 2060. Figure 3(B) shows the probability density
functions for the maximum decadal rate of global mean
3
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Figure 3. Probability density functions for the maximum annual rate
of global mean temperature change (A) and for decadal rates of
global mean temperature change (B) between 1990 and 2100.
Decadal temperature changes represent the maximum decadal rate in
the BAU simulations (red line), and temperature changes during the
first (green line) and second (blue line) decades following the
removal of geoengineering.
temperature change. The highest decadal temperature changes
occurred immediately following the termination of climate
engineering (2060–2069), with rates ranging from 1.0 to
1.7 ◦C/decade (5–95% confidence interval), and a most likely
rate of 1.3 ◦C/decade. By the second decade (2070–2079),
the most likely warming rate had decreased to 0.33 ◦C/decade
(5–95% confidence interval: 0.28–0.55 ◦C/decade), slightly
higher than the most likely decadal warming in the BAU
simulations (0.29 ◦C/decade; 5–95% confidence interval 0.2–
0.41 ◦C/decade).
Figure 4(A) shows the probability of exceeding a given
rate of annual temperature change. In the climate engineering
simulations (green line) there was a 65% probability of
exceeding a rate of 0.5 ◦C/year; for the same rate of warming
in the business as usual simulation (red line) the probability
of exceeding was 0%. Figure 4(B) shows the probability of
exceeding a given decadal rate of global mean temperature
change. In the first decade following the removal of
climate engineering (2060–2069: green line) there was a 96%
probability of exceeding 1 ◦C warming, and a 25% probability
of exceeding 1.5 ◦C. In the second decade (2070–2079: blue
line) the probability of exceeding 0.5 (0.3, 0.1) ◦C warming per
Figure 4. Probability of exceeding the maximum annual rate of
temperature change (A) and decadal rates of temperature change (B)
between 1990 and 2100. Decadal temperature changes represent the
maximum decadal rate in the BAU simulations (red line), and
temperature changes during the first (green line) and second (blue
line) decades following the removal of geoengineering.
decade, was 15% (75%, 100%). In the BAU simulations, these
same thresholds (1.0, 0.3, 0.5, 0.1 ◦C/decade) were exceeded
with 0, 1.5, 42.5 and 100% likelihood, respectively.
4. Discussion
In this letter, we showed that the use of planetary-scale
geoengineering carries a risk of rapid climate change in the
case of its abrupt removal or sudden failure. The sustained
high rates of warming in these simulations could have serious
environmental impacts on many biomes and natural systems,
and could compromise the ability of ecosystems to ‘adapt
naturally to climate change’ as required by the UNFCCC.
No consensus exists in the literature as to what rate
of climate change could result in dangerous ecosystem
impacts. The Summary for Policymakers of the IPCC’s Fourth
Assessment Report stated clearly that the magnitude and timing
of impacts that will ultimately be realized depends both on the
amount and the rate of climate change (IPCC 2007). Vliet
and Leemans (2006) assessed the ecological impacts of climate
change on various biomes in response to different ranges of
rates of temperature change. For example, Vliet and Leemans
(2006) stated that a warming rate greater than 0.1 ◦C/decade
would threaten most ecosystems and decrease their ability to
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adapt naturally. The proposed rate of temperature increase
of 0.05 ◦C/decade is a threshold to protect ecosystems; above
this amount, ecosystem damage is increasingly likely to occur.
The authors argued that with increasing rates of change
there would be progressively more ecosystem loss, increased
ecosystem vulnerability, decreased biodiversity and aggressive
opportunistic species dominance across the globe.
In a similar study, Leemans and Eickhout (2004) looked
at rates of climate change based on global mean temperature in
2100 and used ecosystem shifts as the major impact indicator.
They found that at a rate of warming of 0.1 ◦C/decade, 50%
of all impacted ecosystems are able to adapt within a century
but only 36% of all impacted forests adapt within the same
time frame. As the rate of change increased the adaptive
capacity of ecosystems rapidly decreased. For example, at a
rate of 0.3 ◦C/decade, only 30% of all impacted ecosystems
and only 17% of all impacted forests would be able to
adapt (Leemans and Eickhout 2004). Higher rates lead to
degraded ecosystems and consequently, impact carbon storage
reservoirs and economic sectors that depend heavily on healthy
functional ecosystems (Leemans and Eickhout 2004). These
thresholds were exceeded with high probability in both the
BAU and climate engineering simulations. However, the
climate engineering scenarios resulted in much higher rates
of warming, with rates of temperature change returning only
to levels comparable to the maximum rates in the BAU
simulations two decades after the forcing was removed.
High rates of warming associated with climate engineer-
ing could also affect marine ecosystem functions. Abrupt
climate change has been linked to overall reductions in
marine ecosystem biodiversity through selection for mobile
or opportunistic species. Yasuhara et al (2008) investigated
the deep-sea fossil record of benthic ostracodes during periods
of rapid climate change to determine its impact on deep-
sea ecosystems. Their results demonstrated that ecosystem
community collapses coincided with abrupt changes in the
deep-ocean circulation and climate changes and that abrupt
climate changes had a direct effect on the surface primary pro-
duction of food source for benthic species. Similarly, Aoyama
et al (2008) showed that biodiversity and plankton community
dynamics were significantly altered due to abnormally high
rates of surface air temperature change in their study area. The
apparent shift in phytoplankton community structure coincided
with the largest warming rate (0.6–1.0 ◦C/decade) observed
in the historical data for this particular geographic region in
Japan, called the Kuroshio stream. These rates of warming
were comparable to the temperature changes we simulated in
the first decade following the removal of climate engineering
(1.0–1.7 ◦C/decade).
There are indications right now that suggest that the
movement of plant species to higher elevations and latitudes
is occurring and large-scale adaptation is already underway
for many species across the globe (Jump and Penuelas
2005). However, when compared with reported rates of past
migrations of plant species, the current rapid rate of climate
change has the potential to exceed the adaptive capacity
of many species. High rates of warming associated with
climate engineering would likely exacerbate this problem.
Furthermore, Jump and Penuelas (2005) showed migration
rates among different species diverge greatly between different
plant species, leading to the formation of novel plant
communities. Current differentiations of populations in
relation to climate demonstrate the strong selective pressures
that climate asserts on natural populations (Jump and Penuelas
2005). Although inter-annual variability is a common
phenomenon and is a normal occurrence, such short-term
variability is tolerated through phenotypic plasticity. When
rates of climate change exceed the threshold of phenotypic
plasticity, distributional and evolutionary changes become
increasingly likely. An important question is whether the
rates of warming following the removal of climate engineering
would be short-term enough to be tolerated. It seems likely
that two decades of very high rates of warming would be
sufficient to severely stress the adaptive capacity of many
species and ecosystems, especially if preceded by some period
of engineered climate stability.
In this study, we have considered a hypothetical on/off
geoengineering scenario in which climate engineering was
both implemented and removed abruptly. This is clearly
an extreme case and the risks we have reported here of
rapid climate warming could be substantially mitigated by a
more gradual implementation and decommissioning of climate
engineering technology. However, one can imagine scenarios
in which abrupt removal of geoengineered climate forcing may
be unavoidable, either due to technological failure, or due
to the emergence of unforeseen negative impacts of climate
engineering. Even in an extreme case of abrupt termination
of geoengineering, the risk of rapid climate change could
also be decreased by successfully mitigating greenhouse gas
emissions during the period of climate engineering. In this
case, it becomes critically important to what extent greenhouse
gas emissions are decreased in the coming decades, and
also to what extent the successful application of climate
engineering may affect other mitigation efforts. Clearly, a
case where the perceived success of geoengineering leads
to decreased incentive to decrease greenhouse gas emissions
would represent a potentially dangerous situation of increasing
geoengineering dependence to avoid the risk of rapid climate
warming that we have reported here.
We note also that the specific warming rates and
probabilities we reported here are dependent on both our
choice of emission scenario (A1B) and our choice of
probability density function for climate sensitivity (Hegerl et al
2006). In addition, we considered only climate sensitivity
uncertainty and not additional uncertainty associated with
ocean heat uptake, natural and anthropogenic forcings or
carbon cycle feedbacks. These additional uncertainties would
affect the transient climate response of the model, and
may therefore affect the decadal-scale rates of temperature
change we have reported. In addition, the MAGICC model
is a simple one dimensional climate model that does not
fully represent the timescales of ocean circulation and heat
uptake changes; as a result, the temperature response to the
abrupt removal of climate engineering that we have reported
may be both somewhat faster and also less sustained than
what would be simulated by a more sophisticated ocean
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model. These additional uncertainties are non-negligible
(Forest et al 2006, Matthews and Keith 2007, Meehl et al
2007) and would invariably change the specific numbers
provided here. However, our intent here was not to conduct
a full probabilistic assessment of all relevant uncertainties,
but rather to highlight the order-of-magnitude risks associated
with geoengineering and rapid climate change. The general
conclusions we presented here are robust, and would hold in a
more comprehensive probabilistic analysis.
5. Conclusion
In this study we used a hypothetical scenario of business as
usual greenhouse gas emissions, in which geoengineering was
implemented at the year 2020, and removed abruptly after 40
years. By varying the climate sensitivity of the MAGICC
model, and using previously published estimates of climate
sensitivity likelihoods, we derived a probability distribution
for the rate of temperature change following the removal of
geoengineering. Our analysis showed that abrupt termination
of climate engineering would carry substantial risk of very high
rates of warming, which would likely exceed the maximum
rate of warming under a business as usual emissions scenario
for up to 2 decades after termination.
Studies of ecosystem sensitivity to temperature change
suggest that species extinctions and ecosystem collapses are
possible consequences of very rapid climate changes. The
adaptive capacity of these ecological systems are sensitive
to the rate at which temperature changes, and could be
affected readily by the risk of high rates of temperature
changes associated with climate engineering. In addition to
the potential impacts on ecological systems we outlined here,
there would clearly be significant impacts on human systems
with associated large economic damages from such rates of
climate changes (Goes et al 2009). These findings suggest
that the use of planetary-scale geoengineering carries its own
risk of dangerous anthropogenic interference in the climate
system, as defined by the UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change, which must be weighted against the risks of
unmitigated climate change.
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